






Arbitration proceedings frequently evolve into challenging disputes due to the complexity of the                       
arguments brought forth by the parties and ultimately by the arbitrators issuing the award. For                           
each claim p pro­arguments are presented by the claimant and con­arguments are presented by                         
the defender.
According to some traditions accounting for valid reasoning taking place after the 'pleadings                       
game', arbitrators should not look for reasons (grounds) outside this well defined 'search space'                         
created by the parties. In certain civil law jurisdictions, the opposite holds. But the communis                           
opinio holds that arbitrators also create arguments, and "a well reasoned opinion can contribute                         2
greatly to the acceptance of the award by the parties by persuading them that the arbitrator                             
understands the case and that his award is basically sound".3
Drawing from research on computational models of argumentation (particularly the Carneades                   
Argumentation System), we explore the graphical representation of arguments in a dispute; then,                       
comparing two different traditions on the limits of the justification of decisions, and devising an                           
intermediate, semi­formal, model, we also show that it can shed light on the theory of dispute                             
1 This paper was written thanks to a scholarship granted by the Center of Arbitration and Mediation of the                                   
Brazilian­Canadian Chamber of Commerce (CAM/CCBC) for a post­doc research stay at the Max Planck                         
Institute for Comparative and International Law in Hamburg, Germany, during the second semester of 2013.
2 G. B. Walker / S. E. Daniels, Argument and dispute resolution systems, in Argumentation 9 (1995), 698.
3 F. Elkoru / E. A. Elkouri, How arbitration works, 4th ed., Washington, Bureau of National Affairs, 1985, p.                                   
281.
resolution.
We conclude our paper with an observation on the usefulness of highly constrained reasoning                         
for Online Dispute Resolution systems. Restricting the search space of arguments exclusively                     
to reasons proposed by the parties (vetoing the introduction of new arguments by the human or                             
artificial arbitrator) is the only way to introduce some kind of decidability ­­ together with                           
foreseeability ­­ in the argumentation system.
1. Brief exposition of CMA and CAS
The field called Computational Models of Argumentation (CMA from here on) is now a mature                           
research area, something that can be ascertained by acknowledging the success of the COMMA                         
biannual conferences since 2006. Having benefited from decades of research in a plethora of                         4
other fields such as philosophy, logic, law and computer science, CMA is the study of                           
argumentation from the point of view of Artificial Intelligence. The perspective which interest us                         5
here is that of law and theory of law, particularly dispute resolution, which sometimes dispense                           
with non­trivial computational tools such as inference engines and could greatly benefit from                       
visualization tools, as we will see. We will not try to survey the field, and neither will we propose                                   
a new immediate contribution to it, except as a guide to new practical research in the area and                                 
as an investigation of how CMA might contribute to the theory of dispute resolution and                           
justification.
But how does CMA sees argumentation? Mainstream CMA could be understood by exploring the                         
ASPIC framework, one of the most successful formal models of argumentation. The acronym                       
stands for Argumentation Service Platform with Integrated Components; it was an initiative                     
supported by the EU 6th Framework Programme whose goal was to "develop knowledge­based                       
services based on semantically rich formalisms called Argumentation Systems". We will                   6
4 Visit http://www.comma­conf.org/​.
5 See T. Bench­Capon / H. Prakken, Argumentation, in A. R. Lodder / A. Oskamp (Eds.), Information                               
Technology and Lawyers: Advanced Technology in the Legal Domain, from Challenges to Daily Routine,                         
2006, Springer, pp. 61–80; C. Reed / T. J. Norman, A roadmap of research in argument and computation, in                                   
same authors, Argumentation Machines ­ New Frontiers in Argument and Computation,                   
Boston/Dordrecht/London, 2003, pp. 1­13.
6 See the presentation at http://www.cossac.org/projects/aspic.
instead quickly and informally outline Dung's abstract argumentation frameworks, the core of                     7
ASPIC, so as to make things easier for the reader without a mathematical background. For a                             
detailed investigation of ASPIC see the technical report by H. Prakken, one of its authors.8
So here is how Dung's abstract argumentation framework looks like:
An argument is a deduction whose premises are assumptions. To attack an argument,                       
one attacks one or more of its assumptions. Thus an argument attacks an argument                      a      
if and only if attacks an assumption in the set of assumptions on which is based.b           a                      b    
An argument attacks an assumption if and only if the conclusion of the argument is the                             
contrary of the assumption. (The same goes for group attacks, from a set of                         
assumptions to a set of assumptions.)
In this context, an abstract argumentation framework (AF) is a pair . Let be a                      A, At}{       A    
set of arguments and a relation of attack (argument attacks argument )        t    AA ⊆ A ×              a      b
between elements of . A set is called conflict­free if and only if there is no      A        B ⊆ A                  
such that attacks . A set defends an argument if and only if for each, a  ai   j ∈ B       ai    aj      B        ai            
argument , if dattacks , then there exists an in such that attacks .  aj ∈ A     aj     ai           ak    B      ak    aj
Informally, a set of arguments is admissible if and only if it contains only arguments          B                    
that have not been attacked or that have been defended when attacked. The semantics is                           
defined by the notion of a preferred extension. We won't delve into the details here.
In Dung's model, the internal structure of arguments does not matter (it is really an abstract                             
model). We need a framework where it does matter, for that is what counts in dispute resolution                               
systems. Thus, Thomas Gordon's Carneades Argumentation System (CAS, for short) is the                     
most appropriate framework ­­ as we will see shortly ­­ since it was designed for use in a                                 
procedural context. Readers interested on the rich history of CAS might want to check out the                             
related papers.
7 P. M. Dung, On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role in nonmonotonic reasoning, logic                               
programming and n­person games, in Artificial Intelligence 77, 2 (1995), 321­357.
8 An abstract framework for argumentation with structured arguments, technical report, University of Utrecht,                         
2009.
To lay down the CAS, basically we need only define statements, premises, arguments and                         
argument graphs:
Definition 1. (Statement) A statement (s) is a declarative sentence in a language. The                         
complement of a statement s is denoted by ­s.
Definition 2. (Premise) A premise (p) is a statement that falls on one of the following                             
categories, and nothing more: an ordinary premise (so), an assumption (sa) or an                       
exception (se). P is the set of premises.
Definition 3. (Argument) An argument is a tuple where c is a statement, d is a                , d, p< c     >                
member of the set and . Note that c denotes the conclusion, d the        pro, con}{       2   p ∈   P                
direction (pro or con), and p the premises of the argument which may be obtained by                             
applying the correspondent functions in this way: c(a), d(a), p(a).
Definition 4. (Argument graph) An argument graph is an acyclic, labeled, finite, directed,                       
bipartite graph consisting of argument nodes and statement nodes. Edges link up                     
premises and conclusions in the arguments. At most one statement node is allowed for                         
s, ­s.
Argument graphs represent justifications, so that there is an acceptability relation between an                       
argument graph and statements, with the whole framework aimed at modelling proofs. A                       
statement, which may be used in several arguments, is thus acceptable if and only if the                             
corresponding argument graph is a proof thereof. In this system, a dispute is about statements                           
s, ­s, that is, about the final acceptability of s or of its complement (if s is accepted, then ­s is                                       
rejected and vice­versa).
The advantage of argument graphs is that they can be easily visualized. In figure 1 below, we                               
give an example of an argument graph for a fragment of a dispute about the applicability of the                                 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG). The main issue is s (CISG applies) or ­s                               
(CISG does not apply):
The case we chose to illustrate the CAS is simple. According to Article 1(1) of the CISG, the                                 
convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of business are                           
in different states. Article 1(1)(a) presents a further premise: both states need to be contracting                           
states. That means both places of business (of each of the parties) must be in contracting                             
states, a premise that depends on the fact that the state has already signed the convention. In                               
our toy case, we have the following fictional facts, some of which are not directly depicted in the                                 
graph: 1) seller and buyer have places of business in different states (statement s1); 2) the state                               
where the buyer has settled his business is England, and England is has not signed the                             
convention (s2); 3) England has announced that it will sign the convention (s3); 4) from s2, we                               
conclude that the state where the buyer has his place of business is not a contracting state (s4).                                 
In the graph, arguments are denoted by circles, and statements by boxes. The use of arrows is                               
self­evident: arguments go from premises (ordinary premises, assumptions or exceptions) to a                     
conclusion. The "+" sign denotes a pro argument, and the ­ sign denotes a con argument. So we                                 
establish the following acceptability relations: all statements above are accepted. The fact that                       
s3 was put forth by the claimant (say) as a desperate con argument against s4 does not prevent                                 
us from accepting s4 (due to the internal structure of the dispute). The conclusion c, "CISG                             
applies", is therefore negated: the pro argument s1 is clearly weaker than the con argument s4.                              9
Why so? Article 1(1)/1(1)(a) provides that the CISG itself applies to contracts of sale of good                             
between parties whose places of business are in different states, except when one or both of                             
these states are non­contracting states (or, alternatively, provided that both these states are                       
contracting states). The x before the statement "CISG applies" denotes that the argument has                         
been rejected, as expected, for if the premises of a con argument hold, then we have sufficient                               
reasons for rejecting the conclusion. It is a very simple example which could otherwise be a very                               
complicated one, with premises attacking assumptions attacking premises undermining               
conclusions and so on. Regardless of complexity, virtually any case could be represented                       
isomorphically at the argumentation level using CAS.10
9 For inferential purposes, in CAS arguments can be given degrees of strength by using real numbers in the                                   
interval [0, 1].
10 For a detailed representation of a very complex and well known case in US litigation, see T. F. Gordon /                                       
The brief exposition and example above illustrate the use of argument graphs for representing                         
the network of statements brought forth by the parties and the arbitrators as a way of                             
consistently arguing about the case or justifying a decision. Although overlooked or ignored by                         
the legal community, it is a very powerful tool (or tools: from simple visualization to sophisticated                             




A search space or solution space in mathematics and computer science is the set of all                             
possible solutions to a given problem. In chess, for instance, the search space is the set of all                                 
valid moves, given a game state. Each point in the corresponding search state represents a                           
possible solution to the problem; usually one deals not with arbitrary solutions, but with feasible                           
ones.
Analogically, we could think of the possible solutions to a dispute as the search space of                             
argumentation. The example given above illustrates that. The case is: does the CISG apply?                         11
There are two main solutions: either it applies (s) or it does not (­s). Arguments pro and con                                 
each of the main solutions, together with the resulting statement are possible complete                       
solutions. They are virtually infinite in general terms, but finite given a case and a record of the                                 
arguments effectively used in the pleadings game: (s*1) CISG applies because the parties have                         
places of business in different states; (s*2) CISG applies because the parties have places of                           
business in different states and it has not been proven that the state where the buyer has his                                 
place of business is a non­contracting state; (­s*1) CISG does not apply because the parties                           
have places of business in different states but it has been proven that the state where the buyer                                 
D. Walton, A Carneades representation of Popov v Hayashi, in Artificial Intelligence and Law 20, 1 (2012),                               
37­56.
11 L. T. McCarty's final remarks on a AI & Law paper by Kevin D. Ashley are worth mentioning: "Let’s face it:                                         
The Law is AI­Complete! This means, by analogy with the theory of NP­Completeness [...] that given any                               
problem X in AI there exists a polynomial­time mapping from X into some problem Y in a particular legal                                   
domain. In order to make progress in this field, we need to identify tractable problems within AI whose                                 
solutions, when applied to the law, yield either genuine theoretical understanding or real practical                         
applications, or both." (T. Bench­Capon et al., A history of AI and Law in 50 papers: 25 years of the                                     
international conference on AI and Law, in Artificial Intelligence and Law 20, 3 (2012), 13.1).
has his place of business is a non­contracting state; and so on (there are virtually infinite                             
solutions!). But suppose the arguments s*1, s*2 and ­s*1 above are either the only selected                           
solutions. Then {s*1, s*2, ­s*1} represents the effective search space of the case. Each of these                             
statements, provided they are accepted, represent a point in the search space.
We call here inventio the process of systematically looking for (plausible) arguments pro and                         
con a given conclusion, i. e., the solution to a case. It is not without reason. The term is exactly                                     
the one used by Ancient writers to refer to the core of the art of argumentation. It is one of the five                                         
canons of rhetoric (disposition, memoria, pronuntiatio, elocutio, inventio), denoting the                 
systematic search for arguments. As put by Cicero himself: inventio est excogitatio rerum                       
verarum aut veri similium, quae causam probabilem reddant. (A fancy alternative would be to                         12
explore the expression ars combinatoria, used by Leibniz in his early career to denote not only                             
mathematical operations (roughly what is done today under the name of Combinatorics), but                       
also the general ability to explore the search space of a legal case.)
Inventio, for short, is the obtaining of all interesting points in the search space of a given case.
Here is where classical rhetoric and theory of law meet. There are two traditions informally                           
accounting for the constraints on the size of the search space of any given case. Although it is                                 
not exactly a good name in a precise historical context, we will call them the "civil law" (CiL) and                                   
the "common law" (CoL) accounts. Civil law, on the one hand, has it that the judge should be                                 
given only the facts of the case so as to be in a position to reach a decision; even though the                                       
parties will provide him or her with a plethora of arguments, the issue of legal justification is the                                 
judge's alone to solve. Da mihi facti, dabo tibi ius. On the other hand, common law has it that the                                     
judge is to restrict his inventio (the search for arguments) to the arguments expressly provided                           
by the parties. He is not allowed to go beyond those arguments.
Now we explore some formal properties in a semi­formal way. It will be useful for understanding                             
what is going on in the intended domain, even when some important elements are left undefined.
Inv is a function which takes as input a case and returns the set of all points in the search                    γ                    
12 De inv. I, 9.
space S of . Let be a case. Then for ,     γ    γ           nv(γ)    {s , s , ..., s , , , ...,− }i = S =   1   2     i   − s1   − s2   sj     , j   i   ∈ ℤ +
, since in our domain of discourse for every s there is an ­s obtained by negating s i = j                                  
(complement may be seen as a function mapping a statement to its logical complement). A                           
solution is a statement node in an argument graph D (a member of the set of all possible                                 
argument graphs for a case) supported by an argument node a also in D. Recall that arguments                               
are represented in CAS as a tuple where c is a statement, d is a member of the set              , d, p< c     >                        
and . A further condition may be imposed on the solution, to wit, that it ispro, con}{       2   p ∈   P                            
accepted. A solution being accepted means that the argument graph is a proof of the                           
corresponding statement; and so each of the different solutions in S induce different argument                         
graphs. The fact that argument graphs are cyclic ensures decidability for a given a solution.
Since (1) S tends to be virtually infinite (i and j may be arbitrarily large) and not even recursively                                   
enumerable, and (2) our intended domain is not fitted for infinite outputs, we need a way of                               
constraining its size. An adequate inventio function inv* is similar to an inventio function inv                           
except that given a case it returns only adequate points, which must be finite in number. An          γ                        
adequate point set is simply the result of applying a selection function to the output search     P ⊂ S                          
space S of . The adequacy of a point is given by a system of justification imposing the      nv(γ)i                            
corresponding selection function. And that is where different accounts on adequate justifications                     
may be of help.
In our semi­formal framework, two extreme solutions come to mind, recalling what we said                         
about CiL and CoL. The first is that the selection function should return only solutions                              P ⊂ S
proposed by the parties in the pleadings stage (only arguments effectively brought forth); the                         
second is that the selection function should return some or all of the solutions proposed by the                               
parties and some new solutions in a possibly empty subset , so that the output is  P ⊂ S                   R ⊂ S          
their union . Either way now the proper subset P of S is finite and well­defined and    R P ⋃   ⊂ S                            
can (given an entirely transparent, formal, framework) be searched over by an algorithm with the                           
proper questions, such as "give me all the solutions using at least one Argument from Expert                             
Witness". S cannot be searched because it is not even recursively enumerable, even given a                           
normative system, principles, goals, cases, and all the facts that can be seen as established.                           
The problem is that R has the same practical disadvantage of S itself: it is possibly infinite. While                                 
we have a source for P, the pleading stage with its dialectical constraints, the possible elements                             
of R are virtually the same as those of S. Recall Solomon's veterotestamentary decision in 1                             
Kings 3:16­28: given solutions by mother_1 and mother_2 about who was the mother of the                           
living child (both elements of P in our artificial framework) he rejected both arguments and                           
decided to divide the child in two (therefore, in our framework, an element of R entirely outside                               
the search space of S). Of course it was only an strategic solution. Such Solomonic solutions                             
are not uncommon in arbitrations and have even been given a name: "splitting the baby".
We introduce the notion of argumentative agents for representing the parties and the form                         
someone a proposed a solution s in the pleadings game, provided that it was done in a valid                                 
way, formalized as prop(a,s). Since the pleadings game is always implicit, we omit it from the                             13
formalization.
The intended function inv* (the first case above) is relatively trivial and can be defined as follows:
(Definition of inv*) Let be a case and for        γ           nv(γ)    {s , s , ..., s , , , ...,− }i = S =   1   2     i   − s1   − s2   sj  
, . Let and be the only argumentative agents in the pleadings game., j   i   ∈ ℤ +    i = j     α     β                  
Then for such that  nv inv(γ))    {s , s , ..., s , , , ...,− }i * ( = P =   1   2     m   − s1   − s2   sn     , j, m, n   i       ∈ ℤ +    
,   and for every  , either   or  . i = j   i, n  jm <     <   sk ∈ P rop(α, s )p   k rop(β, )p  sk
Since the second extreme case possibly includes R, we only need a function inv** that                           
combines inv and inv*. That can be easily done, but we will explore a more interesting                             
intermediate case, that seems to reflect empirical data on the justification of awards in                         
arbitration. First we have to understand what are the informal constraints on inventio in                         
arbitration proceedings.
3. Theoretical and empirical note on inventio and justification in arbitration
This paper is based on two common sense assumptions: (a) all international arbitration systems                         
of note require that at least final decisions be justified by precisely indicating the reasons upon                             
which they are based; (b) implicitly or otherwise, the majority of systems also provide for that                             14
13 Recall the notion of an argument move discussed in the literature, but note that it is a final move and a                                         
complete solution (a statement backed by an argument) in an argument graph.
14 See, for instance: UNCITRAL Model Rule, Article 31(2); ICC Rules of Arbitration 2012, Article 31(2); LCIA                               
Rules 26.1; AAA International Dispute Resolution Rules, 27.2; ICSID Convention, Article 48(3). Some                       
systems provide that the parties may agree otherwise. See Ph. Fouchard / E. Gaillard / B. Goldman, Traité                                 
awards be based only on the matters put before the arbitrators by the parties; consequently, that                             
the award shall not deal with arguments that were not discussed during the arbitration.15
Ideally, a good decision is not one for which there are some good reasons for it, but one for                                   
which one could say that "on balance, all reasons considered, the decision represents the best                           
resolution of the available reasons." Of course, we understand the already mentioned problem                       16
raised by the computer scientist Thomas F. Gordon: it is impossible to consider all reasons,                           
since the set of possible arguments is not even recursively enumerable. That is why we think                             17
the state of the otherwise dynamic set of arguments presented by the parties during the                           
pleadings stage is the mandatory starting point for the effective argumentation space of                       
justification in arbitration. Perhaps only argumentation theory and CMA could convey this idea.
The goal of an award being not only to present a good solution, but also ­­ and perhaps more                                   
importantly ­­ to persuade the parties that it is a good solution, it is clear that the investigation on                                   
the bounds of inventio is of utmost importance.
Consider the usual, canonical, form of justification in arbitration (and other dispute resolution                       
systems, including judicial rulings): as regards item n of the dispute, claimed that x because                      α        
of X and claimed that y because of Y; the arbitrator decides that z because of Z. (Notice that      β                                
X, Y and Z are nonempty sets of grounds in the intended domain, provided that one accepts the                                 
assumption (a) above.) One can easily see that the following bounds on z and Z are the only                                 
ones that may be logically conceived of: (1) the arbitrator may decide that z because of Z if and                                   
only if either z = x and Z = X, or z = y and Z = Y; (2) the arbitrator may decide that z because of                                                   
Z if and only if either z = x or z = y; (3) the arbitrator may decide that z because of Z if and only if                                                   
either Z = X or Z = Y; (4) the arbitrator may decide that z because of Z regardless of x, y and                                           
de l'arbitrage commercial international, Litec, 1996. This is not, and notably has not been, always true in                               
Common Law systems and in some English speaking countries, although the most recent trend strongly                           
favors reasoned awards; see R. David, Arbitration in international trade, Kluwer, 1985, pp. 319­320.
15 L. A. Mistelis (ed.), Concise international arbitration, Kluwer, 2010, p. 364. The most immediate reason for                               
that kind of provision is ­­ regarding the worst case scenario ­­ that awards deciding ultra and citra petita                                   






grounds thereto X, Y. Otherwise (and less precisely) stated, the arbitrator's argumentation may                       18
be bound both by the premises and the conclusion that immediately supports the claim as                           
presented by the parties to the dispute; only by the premises; only by the conclusion; or by                               
neither of them.
Before we proceed with the investigation in the next section, we briefly summarize theoretical                         
and empirical findings related to the issue above.
On the one hand, the theoretical status of this question is dubious. Commentators rarely                         
address the issue with the required precision, perhaps due to their focus on non­formal                         
approaches. We do not think that this superficiality is wise; that does not even favor pragmatism,                             
for superficiality leave all the practical problems entirely open. Likewise, philosophers of law                       
either address the problem of the search space of arguments in arbitration only indirectly, for                           
local law codes in the CiL tradition and CoL provide different and mutually inconsistent answers,                           
or they simply ignore it. The most important problem, in our view, can be reduced to a single                                 19
twofold question: is it permitted for arbitrators to fabricate one or more arguments that were not                             
even mentioned, or implied, by the parties to the dispute, and if so, do these arguments include                               
only conclusions or also premises?
On the other hand, in practice, approaches vary greatly. A certain empirical analysis in the field                             
of jurimetrics could, notwithstanding, illuminate the issue. It was conducted by Ole Kristian                       
Fauchald of the University of Oslo; a detailed investigation of motivation (among other problems)                         
using a corpus of nearly 100 arbitration awards issued by ad hoc tribunals of the International                             
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) revealed that they "made an effort to                           
address all arguments raised by the parties to the dispute", but that "this does not prevent[ed]                             
tribunals from exercising judicial restraint by avoiding dealing with issues that can be left aside                           
as a consequence of conclusions on other issues"; particularly, "tribunals responded explicitly                     
18 This kind of imprecise restatement of formal or semi­formal propositions is dangerous but can be used to
facilitate understanding of the main issue.
19 For some general discussions on the justification of decisions, See I. Scheffler, On justification and                             
commitment, in Journal of Philosophy 51 (1954), 180­190; N. MacCormick, The artificial reason and                         
judgement of law, in Beheft 2 (1981), 105­120; A. Arnio / R. Alexy / A. Peczinik, The foundation of legal                                     
reasoning, in Rechtstheorie 12 (1981), 423­448; R. Sartorius, The justification of judicial decision, in Ethics                           
78 (1968), 171­187; A. Peczenik, Grundlagen der juristischen Argumentation, Springer, 1983.
and in detail to all arguments of the parties to the dispute". It seems that in the majority of                                   20
decisions, arbitrators used the arguments presented by the parties as the starting point for the                           
work of justifying their conclusions, but that they did not consider the state of arguments to be a                                 
necessary bound on their discretion. Our own brief and ad hoc quantitative research on the                           
corpus of 2001­2007 awards issued by arbitral tribunals under the ICC Rules and administration                         
allowed us to reach the same conclusion. Most notably: (1) sometimes both parties used the                             21
same argument, and the arbitrators concurred, adopting exclusively the premises and the                     
conclusion presented by them; (2) sometimes the arbitrators raised an issue not discussed by                         22
the parties and fabricated an entirely new argument alleging it was a public law issue, but                             
following a mutual agreement by the parties; (3) sometimes the arbitrators considered                     23
premises and conclusion presented by the claimant and premises and conclusion presented by                       
the defendant and decided by adopting either the whole argument of the claimant or the whole                             
argument of the defendant; (4) on one occasion the parties agreed upon an issue, presenting                           24
their arguments, and the tribunal, noting the agreement, simply adopted the consensual                     
interpretation, without presenting its own arguments; (5) on one occasion, the tribunal                     25
considered the argument of the parties, adopted the conclusion of the claimant but, without                         
properly rejecting his premises, adopted a different premise; (6) on the same occasion, the                         26
tribunal adopted the premise presented by the defendant, which was the same as the one                           
presented by the claimant, but rejected the conclusion of the former, concurring with the                         
(different) conclusion of the latter.27
The findings allow us to conclude, further, on plausible theoretical, legal and empirical grounds                         
that unless the case deals with a public issue, the tribunal is defeasibly allowed to vary on the                                 
sets of grounds X, Y presented by the parties, but not on the set of claims raised by the parties                                     
x, y. As regards public issues, it seems reasonable that they are allowed to be raised by the                                 
arbitrators; but in that case it should be decided only after consultation with the parties, since one                               
of the main goals of the award is to present a rhetorically correct solution to the case.










Based on our conclusions above, it seems that the best way of attacking the issue of the                               
constraints on the search space of argumentation in arbitration, aiming at proposing a                       
'persuasion­driven', rhetorically correct model of award drafting, is to follow an algorithmic                     
approach.
The parties to a dispute, at the time of the decision, have already presented their cases. All the                                 
arguments were brought forth, and the arbitrator is now bound both by the primary duty to decide                               
(non liquet not being a possible way out) and by the duty to decide within the limits drawn by the                                     
issues and arguments presented. The duty is one of invention. Recall the CAS sketched above                           
and the functions inv*, inv defined. Given the result of the inventio already carried forth, in a                               
dialectical way, by the parties, the arbitrator should then apply his own inventio to the result; that                               
should bring us back to the problem sketched in the last section, which has four basic possible                               
solutions: should his inventio be bound both by the premises and the conclusion presented by                           
the parties to the dispute, only by the premises, only by the conclusion, or by neither of them?                                 
Based on the conclusions established in last section, he is bound only by the conclusions x or y,                                 
which may be identical, but not by the sets of grounds X, Y. For each item n of the dispositive                                     
section, he may use a new set of grounds Z to back his decision in favor of conclusion x or                                     
conclusion y, even when faced with a public issue (that should be added to the premises already                               
in Z). But what is the use of X and Y? Utterly ignoring them would be a violation of the purpose of                                         
basic due process principles such as that of contradiction (audiatur et altera pars). It would be                             
absurd to hear both parties if their arguments should in be ignored after all.
That have been said, we are ready to present our model. Let CAS be the underlying                             
argumentation system, with working definitions. Let be a case with dispositive items            γ            
and for , . Let andn , n , ..., n }{ 1   2     i     nv(γ)    {s , s , ..., s , , , ...,− }i = S =   1   2     i   − s1   − s2   sj     , j   i   ∈ ℤ +    i = j    α  
be the only argumentative agents in the pleadings game. Let be a solution s backed byβ                      Γk ≻ sk            
a set of reasons. The set of party­solutions (or search space of argumentation as defined by the                               
parties)  is then:
for such  {Γ , Γ ≻ , ..., Γ , Δ − , Δ − , ..., }P =   1 ≻ s1   2 s2     m ≻ sm   1 ≻ s1   2 ≻ s2    Δ −n ≻ sn     m, n       ∈ ℤ +  
that for every  , either   or  .Γk ≻ sk  ∈ P rop(α, Γ )p   k ≻ sk  rop(β, Γ )p   k ≻ sk 
The inventio function representing the selective activity of an arbitrator given the search space of                           
argumentation P provided by the parties can be thus characterized as follows:
inventio(P) = for each dispositive item n in the decision, nondeterministically either (a)                       
such that for each , and or (b)/prop(α, Γ )P   k ≻ sk  ⋃ S           sl ∈ S   sl = sk ∈ P   rop(β, s )p   l    
 such that for each  ,  and  ./prop(β, Γ )P   k ≻ sk  ⋃ S sl ∈ S sl = sk ∈ P rop(α, s )p   l 
That means, for each item of the decision, either the inventio results in a solution proposed by                                 α
together with reasons invoked by in addition to new reasons invoked by the arbitrator; or in a          α                        
solution proposed by together with reasons invoked by in addition to new reasons invoked      β             β            
by the arbitrator.
A conservative approach ­­ sometimes found in practice, as our investigation above reveals ­­                         
would be to further constrain inventio(P), vetoing new reasons (premises) introduced by the                       
arbitrator. That would demand a different inventio function defined as follows:
inventio*(P) = for each dispositive item n in the decision, nondeterministically either (a)                       
such that for each , and or (b)/prop(α, Γ )P   k ≻ sk  ⋃ S           sl ∈ S   sl = sk ∈ P   rop(β, Γ )p   k ≻ sk     
 such that for each  ,  and  ./prop(β, Γ )P   k ≻ sk  ⋃ S sl ∈ S sl = sk ∈ P rop(α, Γ )p   k ≻ sk 
This second approach is likely to simplify the formal apparatus, facilitating computational                     
implementations of argumentation models, but may be seen as unrealistic in the light of the                           
real­life functioning of the majority of human­centered systems.
We note ­­ most importantly ­­ that Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) could favor this second                           
approach (using the strongly constrained inventio* to obtain the search space of argumentation),                       
since the enlarging of the search space is computationally unfeasible, in addition to foster total                           
undecidability (solutions are not recursively enumerable). It is also impossible to automatically                     
generate new premises, unless a new apparatus is introduced for that purpose. Nonetheless, it                         
is doubtful that such an ODR system would be unfair. Constraints on the search space of                             28
argumentation can be justified by showing that foreseeability is to be favored over traditional                         
material justice. In that way it is possible to transcend the CiL and CoL traditions and the mere                                 
pragmatics of award justification in arbitration.
Moreover, if the parties agree beforehand that only the justifications provided by them are to be                             
taken into consideration by the arbitrator, it does not appear that the resulting decision system                           
should be a priori regarded as unfair. It should also be noted that foreseeability and effectiveness                             
are also criteria for (procedural) justice.
28 Compare I. A. Letia / A. Groza, Structured argumentation in a mediator for Online Dispute Resolution, in                                 
M. Baldoni et al (Eds.), Declarative Agent Languages and Technologies V, 5th International Workshop,                         
DALT 2007, Honolulu, HI, USA, May 14, 2007, Springer, 2008, pp. 193­210.
